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This paper examines the country-level dynamics of long-run growth in Africa between 
1975 and 2005. We are primarily interested in examining how growth has affected 
mobility and the distribution of income among countries. We analyse changes in the 
cross-country income structure and convergence. We also look for evidence of the 
formation of country groups or ‘clubs’. Finally, we use a novel method of breaking up 
the growth histories of African economies into medium term spells of growth 
accelerations and declines to see if a group of African ‘leopards’—the regional 
equivalent of Asia’s ‘tigers’—is beginning to emerge 
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After stagnating for much of its post-colonial history, economic performance in   
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has markedly improved. Since 1995, average economic 
growth has been close to 5 per cent per year. Countries with at least 4 per cent GDP 
growth now constitute about 70 per cent of the region’s total population and 80 per cent 
of its GDP. Per capita income grew by 1.6 per cent a year in the late 1990s and by 2-3 
per cent in each year since 2000.  
Recent popular and academic writing has suggested that Africa may be at a turning 
point in its long economic decline (see, for example, Commission for Africa 2005; 
Ndulu et al. 2007). But predictions of Africa’s imminent economic recovery or demise 
have proved wrong on numerous occasions in the past 40 years. Growth in Africa since 
1975 has been lower and more volatile than in any other region of the world—
developed or developing (Table 1). And, unlike East and (more recently) South Asia it 
has had few regional ‘champions’ to serve as models of successful, rapidly growing 
economies.1  
Using the most recent purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 44 SSA countries, this 
paper examines country-level dynamics of long-run growth in Africa between 1975 and 
2005. The next section describes our data and the characteristics of Africa’s long-run 
growth. Here we confirm previous findings that the major characteristics of growth in 
Africa are its low long-run trend and its extreme volatility at the country level. We find 
no persuasive evidence of growth persistence within countries and only weak evidence 
of persistence at the regional level since 1990. 
Section 3 examines how the growth recovery has affected the distribution of income 
among countries in the region. We describe the country level distribution of income in 
Africa and test for convergence in per capita income levels between richer and poorer 
countries. We find no evidence that poorer countries in Africa are converging to the 
income levels of their richer neighbours. We find persuasive evidence of inertia in per 
capita incomes for economies in Africa. Where countries began in terms of relative 
income in 1975 is an excellent predictor of where they ended up in 2005. Because the 
rich economies are growing faster than their poorer neighbours we also find that inter-
country distribution of income has become less equal over time.  
The fourth section of the paper presents our hunt for the leopards. One indication that 
Africa has indeed reached a turning point, would be evidence that a group of African 
economies with high and accelerating long-run growth—‘leopards’, the regional 
equivalent of Asia’s ‘tigers’—is beginning to emerge. We first identify four groups of 
countries according to their income levels and growth experiences, and we look for 
some common characteristics that are associated with these groups. Two distinct and 
stable income groups or ‘clubs’, rich and poor, are identifiable in the data. Our most 
striking finding is that transitions from low income to higher income levels have been 
rare in the last 30 years. Only two countries, both oil exporters, made the transition. We 
then use the approach to growth accelerations and decelerations developed by Arbache 
and Page (2007) to see if a subset of countries with a high frequency of rapid growth 
                                                 
1   Botswana and Mauritius are notable exceptions to this statement, a theme to which we shall return 
below.   
2 
accelerations emerges during 1995-2005. Based on our results for income transitions, 
growth thresholds and growth accelerations, we identify six economies that show the 
potential to be Africa’s growth leaders. Section 6 concludes.  
Table 1 
GDP per capita and growth by region (weighted data) 
Region  1975-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 
   GDP per capita 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1,928  1,844 1,782 1,648 1,668 1,768 
East Asia & Pacific  905  1,227 1,686 2,407 3,399 4,595 
Latin America & Caribbean  6,020  6,295 6,315 6,450 6,978 7,205 
Middle East & North Africa  4,179 4,180 4,055 4,326 4,651 5,197 
South Asia  1,132  1,268  1,505 1,745 2,110 2,530 
Low & middle income  2,278  2,560 2,881 3,045 3,513 4,219 
   Growth 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.06 -1.60 -0.21 -1.64  0.79  1.79 
East Asia & Pacific  5.26  6.12 5.76 9.10 5.63 7.06 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.31  -0.95  -0.43 1.61 1.53 1.21 
Middle East & North Africa  -0.20 2.41  -1.20 1.18 1.91 2.78 
South Asia  1.03  3.14  3.89 3.01 3.59 4.65 
Low & middle income  2.79  1.99 1.93 1.56 3.23 4.58 
Note:  All Sub-Saharan African countries are included in calculations. 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
2  Chaos without change: Africa’s long-run growth, 1975-2005 
This section describes long-run trends in per capita income growth for 44 African 
economies. Data on GDP per capita at 2000 international PPP prices are taken from the 
World Development Indicators and span the years 1975 to 2005.2 Our sample contains 
all Sub-Saharan African countries for which PPP GDP data exist. There are no GDP per 
capita PPP data for Liberia, San Tomé and Principe, and Somalia, and they are excluded 
from the analysis.3 The un-weighted mean GDP per capita between 1975 and 2005 for 
the 44 countries in our sample was US$2,306. Mean GDP per capita using GDP 
weighted data was US$1,702.4 Appendix Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for 
income and growth at the country level.  
Figure 1 presents the timepaths of un-weighted and GDP weighted per capita income 
growth rates.5 Although the trajectories of the un-weighted and weighted series appear 
                                                 
2   1975 is the first year available for this indicator. 
3   We, thus, have a panel of data with 44 countries and 31 periods. Our sample accounts for 98.4 per 
cent of population and 99 per cent of regional GDP in 2005. Although Equatorial Guinea is in our 
sample, we remove the country from charts, econometrics, and aggregate descriptive statistics because 
its extremely high growth rates in recent years distort many of the results.  
4  Although there are differences between GDP per capita at PPP and non-PPP, those differences are 
confined to levels and do not affect growth trajectories. PPP and non-PPP growth data share similar 
statistical properties. See Arbache and Page (2008) for a fuller discussion.  
5   We employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter in Figure 1 to smooth the estimate of the long-term trend 
component of the GDP growth series.  
3 
similar, their means and variances are significantly different. The region’s un-weighted 
average growth rate was 0.71 per cent and its standard deviation (SD) was 6.32 per cent. 
The mean and SD of the weighted data are –0.17 per cent and 1.7 per cent, respectively, 
reflecting the fact that Africa’s bigger economies grew more slowly than its smaller 
ones. Between 1975 and 2005, South Africa, which represents, on average, 42 per cent 
of the region’s GDP, grew in per capita terms by an average of only 0.12 per cent a 
year; and Nigeria, the region’s second-largest economy, (13.50 per cent of GDP) grew 
by 0.28 per cent.  
Figure 1 
GDP per capita growth, 1975-2005 
Figure 2 
Stability test: Recursive residual estimation of growth rates 
Source: Authors’  computations.  
4 
Both the un-weighted and weighted series show a positive trend beginning in the mid-
1990s. In the period 1995–2005, un-weighted average GDP growth per capita was 1.81 
per cent, more than twice the long-term average. In order to test for statistically 
meaningful breaks in the mid-1990s, we ran recursive residual estimations and other 
stability tests. Figure 2 shows the recursive estimation for the growth series. There is 
statistical evidence that growth accelerated around 1995. Both the Chow breakpoint and 
forecast tests support the conclusion that a structural break in the income growth series 
occurred in the mid-1990s.6  
Growth rates for individual countries were low, and the coefficient of variation was 
high, indicating that growth was highly erratic (Appendix Table A1). Figure 3 shows 
that African economies have by far the least predictable growth globally, as measured 
by the coefficient of variation (CV). Countries with different levels of income (like 
South Africa and Malawi), geographical locations (like Mali and Senegal), resource 
endowments (like Nigeria and Ethiopia), and long-term GDP per capita growth patterns 
(like Gabon, Niger, Madagascar, and Swaziland) share a common characteristic, high 
growth volatility.  
Table 2 decomposes the standard deviation of GDP per capita and its growth into 
within- and between-country components. Growth is highly unstable in individual 
countries; the ratio of the within-country SD to the total SD of growth rates is 94 per 
cent. The Comoros (-22.6), Ethiopia (18.4), Guinea-Bissau (-11.9), Malawi (24.6), 
Mauritania (34.6), Namibia (19.8), Nigeria (18.7), and South Africa (20.6) are notable 
for their extremely high volatility, even by regional standards. 
Figure 3 
GDP per capita growth - man, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation by region (GDP weighted data), 1975-2005 
 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
 
                                                 
6   We also find evidence of a structural break in the per capita income series at about the same time.   
5 
Table 2 
Decomposition of standard deviation of GDP per capita and growth, 1975-2005 
   Standard  deviation 
Variable   Mean  Overall  Between countries  Within countries
GDP per capita  2,306  2,633  2,490  809 
GDP per capita growth  0.71  6.32  2.26  5.95 
Notes:   Statistics calculated from panel data. 
 
Figure 4 
Density of GDP per capita growth across countries 
 
 
Only three economies—Botswana (0.5), Cape Verde (0.8), and Mauritius (0.4)—have 
coefficients of variation of less than 1.0. These three economies are also notable for 
their high long-term growth rates, ranking second through fourth out of the sample in 
terms of their overall rate of per capita income growth, 1975-2005.7  
Kernel densities of the distribution of per capita GDP growth rates at ten year intervals 
are shown in Figure 4. The growth acceleration of 1995-2005 is clearly visible in the 
rightward shift of the distribution.  
The most striking change in the distribution over time, however, is the extent to which 
growth rates have converged (Figure 4a). The 1976 distribution is remarkably flat. Since 
then, there have been increasingly more acute peaks around the mean (Figures 4b-4d).  
                                                 
7   Equatorial Guinea, which ranks first, and Lesotho, which ranks fifth, have the same coefficient of 
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Figure 4d: 1995 vs. 2005
Source: Authors’  computations.  
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Figure 5 
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Source: Authors’  computations. 
The SD of growth rates dropped from 8.2 per cent in 1976 to 3.6 per cent in 2005. Two 
sets of outliers—high performers and economies in decline—also appear to be emerging 
in the 1995 and 2005 distributions (Figures 4c and 4d).  
An important question with respect to long-term growth is whether it has been 
persistent. Figure 5 shows the results of regressing average GDP per capita growth on 
growth in the first year of our series, 1975-76:  
ε β α + Δ + = Δ ) (
76
i i Y Y ,   (1) 
where  i Y Δ  is the average growth of country i, and 
76
i Y Δ is the growth rate of country i 
in 1976, the first year in our series. Not surprisingly, given the extreme variability of 
growth rates, there is no evidence of growth persistence. The coefficient of β  is close to 
zero and insignificant (β = 0.061, t = 1.65).8 Growth in 1976 for the representative 
African country fails to predict average growth in the subsequent 30 years. 
We also stratify the data before and after 1995 to assess whether there was evidence of 
persistence during either of the two subperiods:  
ε β α + Δ + = Δ
− ) (
76 94 76
i i Y Y    (2) 




i  (3) 
where 
94 76− Δ i Y  is average GDP per capita growth between 1976 and 1994, 
05 95− Δ i Y  is 
average GDP per capita growth between 1995 and 2005, and 
76
i Y Δ  and 
95
i Y Δ  are the 
growth rate of country i in 1976 and 1991. 
                                                 
8   Gabon grew 31 per cent in 1976, biasing the results. Thus we remove it from the regression.  
7 
The results are shown in Figures 6a and 6b. The coefficients of β  are 0.06 (1.38) and 
0.21 (3.06), respectively, for the first and second periods, suggesting that growth 
became more predictable from the mid-1990s on, a result that is in line with the kernel 
density exercises.9 
As an additional check for persistence at the individual country level, we calculate the 
correlation coefficients of growth over time for individual countries. Statistically 
significant coefficients indicate that country growth rates follow predictable patterns. 
The very large majority of correlation coefficients before 1995 are not statistically 
significant, but about a third of the coefficients of 1995-2005 are significant (Arbache 
and Page 2008). This suggests that at the individual country level, growth was generally 
erratic, although there was increased persistence between 1995 and 2005.10 
In sum for the region as a whole, and for the vast majority of African economies, 
growth from 1975 to 2005 has been both disappointing and volatile. Growth on average 
has accelerated and has shown a weak tendency to become more persistent over time, 
but for the individual African country, past growth helps very little to predict future 
growth.  
Figure 6 
Average growth as a function of initial conditions by time period 
Figure 6a       Figure 6b 
 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
3  Rich country, poor country 
Africa’s mean GDP per capita had a slowly rising long-term trend, consisting of about 
20 years of virtual stagnation with an inflexion point upward in the mid 1990s 
(Figure 7).11 Income per person in the average African economy declined towards the 
middle of the 1990s and then recovered. Weighting by GDP (Figure 7b) gives a U- 
shaped pattern of GDP per capita, reaching a minimum in the mid-1990s. Africa’s 
 
                                                 
9   We have removed Rwanda from the regression and Figure 6b because it grew 37.5 per cent in 1995, 
distorting the results. 
10  Easterly et al. (1993) find for a worldwide sample that correlation of growth across decades is also 
very low, averaging 0.3. 
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GDP per capita, 1975-2005 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
largest economies, measured in terms of GDP, experienced some of its greatest income 
declines between 1975 and 1994. By 2005, income weighted GDP per capita had not yet 
recovered to the levels observed in the mid-1970s.  
For most individual African economies GDP per capita registered only modest increases 
between 1975 and 2005, and many countries—such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe—had declining per capita incomes over the 
period. The SD of income per capita was generally low, and the CV of many countries 
is close to zero. Most of the variation (69 per cent) in Africa’s average income per 
person occurs between countries (Table 2) rather than within them.  
Figure 8 shows comparative kernel density plots of GDP per capita for at 10-year 
intervals between 1975 and 2005. The kernel plot is helpful in identifying shifting 
patterns in the distribution of country level incomes per capita, such as the formation of 
identifiable groups or ‘clubs’ (Quah 1993a, 1993b). The slight movement toward the 
right of the GDP per capita plot of 2005 compared with that of 1975 (figure 8a) reflects 
the region’s slow economic growth. Most of that movement took place between 1995 
and 2005, when we observe a noticeable slide to the right, reflecting increasing incomes 
throughout Africa (Figure 8d). Since the mid-1990s, the variance of income per capita 




Density of GDP per capita across countries 
 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
Since 1975 there has been a pronounced bimodality in the distribution of income among 
countries in Africa. The twin peaks observed in each of the panels of Figure 8 define 
two groups of countries, rich and poor, which are relatively stable over the thirty year 
period. The most significant shift toward polarization of the country level distribution 
occurred between 1985 and 1995 (Figure 8c), a period when many countries were 
devastated by conflicts. Polarization was reduced somewhat between 1995 and 2005.  
The second peak virtually disappears in each 10-year period when we remove 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, and South Africa 
from the data. Thus these seven countries form a stable, rich country club.12 With the 
exception of South Africa, the members of the club are small economies, and they have 
relatively little in common with one another. Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius had 
high growth—even by global standards—and low growth volatility. The Seychelles had 
more moderate growth with high volatility. Namibia and South Africa barely grew but 
were highly erratic growers, and Gabon declined with high volatility. Cape Verde 
Mauritius and the Seychelles are islands. Botswana is landlocked and resource rich.  
Table 3 shows, for 43 countries, the ratio of their GDP per capita to that of South 
Africa, the richest African economy in 1975. These data show little upward income 
 
                                                 
12  In 2005, those countries hosted about 8.5 per cent of the regional population, but produced 44 per cent 
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Figure 8d: 1995 vs. 2005 
10 
Table 3 










(or most recent 
year) 
Angola 0.19  0.21  Lesotho 0.12  0.30 
Benin 0.09  0.10  Madagascar  0.13  0.08 
Botswana 0.19  1.12  Malawi  0.06  0.06 
Burkina Faso  0.08  0.11  Mali  0.08  0.09 
Burundi 0.08  0.06  Mauritania 0.20  0.20 
Cameroon 0.18  0.21  Mauritius 0.40  1.14 
Cape Verde  0.23  0.52  Mozambique  0.07  0.11 
Central African Republic  0.17 0.11  Namibia  0.65 0.68 
Chad 0.10  0.13  Niger  0.10  0.07 
Comoros 0.19  0.18  Nigeria  0.10  0.10 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.23  0.06 Rwanda  0.09  0.11 
Congo, Rep.  0.10  0.11 Senegal  0.15  0.16 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.25  0.15  Seychelles  0.76  1.45 
Equatorial Guinea  0.13  0.73 Sierra  Leone  0.10  0.07 
Eritrea 0.09  0.10  Sudan 0.12  0.19 
Ethiopia 0.09  0.09  Swaziland  0.32  0.43 
Gabon 0.97  0.63  Tanzania 0.05  0.07 
Gambia, The  0.16  0.17  Togo  0.18  0.14 
Ghana 0.20  0.22  Uganda  0.08  0.13 
Guinea 0.19  0.21  Zambia  0.14  0.09 
Guinea-Bissau 0.11  0.07  Zimbabwe  0.29  0.18 
Kenya 0.10  0.11         
Note:  The ratio is the fraction of GDP per capita to South Africa's. 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
mobility among African countries. Despite South Africa’s long period of slow growth, 
only nine countries—Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland and Uganda—had an increase in their GDP per capita of 
at least 5 percentage points relative to South Africa. Of these, only Sudan and Uganda 
are not members of the rich country club identified above. Botswana, Mauritius and the 
Seychelles were the only economies to overtake South Africa in terms of per capita 
income. An important ‘neighbourhood effect’ is apparent in the data. Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland, all to a large degree integrated into the South African 
economy, are among the faster converging economies. 
Twenty-three countries experienced little or no change in their income levels relative to 
South Africa, and 11—including Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe—
had sharp deteriorations. The increase in income divergence was particularly sharp in 
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon. It is interesting to note 
that a majority of resource-rich countries (including oil exporters) did not improve their 
relative positions (Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and 
Zambia), providing support to the arguments of Collier (2007) and others that the 
‘natural resource curse’ is particularly relevant in Africa. 
A more formal test of whether the income per capita of poorer African countries is 
converging toward the regions’ richer ones can be conducted using the following 
unconditional convergence model: 
ε β α + + = Δ
75
i Y Yi ,   (4)  
11 
where  i Y Δ  is the average growth rate of country i, and 
75
i Y  is the GDP per capita of 
country i in 1975. For convergence to occur, poor countries have to grow faster (Barro 
1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991), making the predicted sign of β  in Equation (4) 
negative. 
The regression, shown graphically in Figure 9, offers no evidence of unconditional 
convergence. The estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero   
(β = –0.122, t = –0.29), indicating that in Africa the initial level of income alone has  
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 9: Average growth as a function of initial conditions
 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
Figure 10 




































Source: Authors’  computations.  
12 
no effect on the growth rate.13 These results confirm our heuristic evidence of 
substantial inertia in the income distribution and are consistent with other research. For 
example, McCoskey (2002) finds no evidence of unconditional convergence in Africa 
using long-run panel data. We also test for convergence in the period 1995-2005—due 
to the structural break that took place in the growth series at about that point—by 
regressing average growth during 1995-2005 on income in 1995. The results (β = 0.43, 
t = 0.19) are essentially the same as those reported for Equation (4).14 Africa’s poorer 
economies were not converging toward the income levels of their richer neighbours, 
even after the growth acceleration.  
The lack of income convergence over the past 30 years has led to an increase in 
inequality of per capita incomes among countries across Africa. Lorenz curves of the 
GDP per capita at 10-year intervals 1975-2005 are presented in Figure 10. These show 
increasing income inequality in each 10-year period. The sharpest rise in inter-country 
inequality took place between 1985 and 1995. This is consistent with the growing 
polarization of income and the emergence of the rich country club shown in the kernel 
densities.  
The ratio of income of the richest 10 per cent of countries to the poorest 10 per cent of 
countries rose from 10.5 in 1975 to 18.5 in 2005. In 1975–-0 South Africa’s GDP per 
capita (then the highest in the region) was 17 times higher than that of Malawi. In 
2000-05, the gap between the highest GDP per capita country, the Seychelles, and 
Malawi had grown to 24 times.  
4  Where you start is where you end up 
The previous sections identified some stylized facts about long-term GDP per capita 
growth and the distribution of income at the country level in Africa. These stylized 
facts—low and volatile growth, the formation of clubs, lack of convergence in income 
levels, and rising inter-country income inequality—point toward little dynamism in 
income growth. In this section, we examine the income dynamics of countries in greater 
detail.  
We begin by asking the question: how stable is the per capita income of a typical 
country in Africa? To test for income stability we run the following regression: 
ε β α + + =
75
i Y Y
i    (5) 
where  i Y  is the mean GDP per capita of country i, and 
75
i Y is the GDP per capita of 
country i in 1975. Given our prior evidence of little income dynamism, we expect that 
average income in a typical African economy will be close to its initial income in 
                                                 
13  The statistical and qualitative results remain the same when we remove outliers such as Botswana and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo from the regression. 
14  We also split the sample into subperiods before 1990 and after 1990 and regress average growth in 
each period on the level of income in 1975. The estimated coefficients of both equations are not 
significant.  
13 
1975.15 If so, the coefficient estimate of β  should be close to 1. A region with a large 
number of dynamic economies would have an estimated coefficient of significantly 
more than 1, indicating that initial income under-predicts average income.  
The result, presented in Figure 11, shows a line near 45 degrees (β = 0.901, t = 7.41). 
Apart from a few cases, the average GDP per capita 1975-2005 closely mirrors that of 
1975, reflecting a high degree of inertia.16 There are some positive outliers, such as 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius and Namibia, whose average GDP per 
capita is well above their 1975 levels. Negative outliers such as the Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, Madagascar and Zambia, had 
average GDP per capita well below their initial levels of income.17  
To check whether there was a change in income stability accompanying the growth 
acceleration after 1995 we run the same stability tests for average GDP per capita for 
the subperiods 1975-94 and 1995-2005 by regressing average income in those periods 
on the initial level of income in 1975. The results are highly significant and close to 1 
(estimated coefficients of 0.891 and 0.909, respectively). These are virtually identical to 
the results of Equation 5, implying that the income structure remained highly stable, 
even after the break in the income and growth series in around 1995.  
Figure 11 
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Figure 11: Mean GDPpc as a function of GDPpc in 1975
 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
5   Hunting for leopards 
Our results up to this point are somewhat discouraging from the perspective of 
identifying a major turn-around in Africa’s economic fortunes. We find no evidence of 
                                                 
15  For countries for which GDP data were not available in 1975, we use the earliest available year. 
16   We also calculate the year-to-year correlation coefficients of GDP per capita within countries over 
time. Most coefficients are large and significant, thus supporting the finding of significant inertia in 
income levels.  
17 We also run the same model while controlling for growth SD, and the results are virtually the same.  
14 
income convergence and very little evidence of significant income mobility across 
countries in the region. Low and volatile growth in Africa has been associated with a 
remarkably stable structure of incomes. For the most part, initial income in 1975 equals 
average income for the entire period 1975-2005 and average income during 1995-2005.  
It is possible, however, that within this stable overall structure, individual countries 
stand out by exhibiting more dynamic behaviour. These ‘leopards’—Africa’s equivalent 
of Asia’s tiger—might be expected to have made the transition from low income to 
higher income status, common to China, Korea, Malaysia, and other newly 
industrializing Asian economies. Korea, for example, began its rapid growth period at 
levels of income well below that of the average Asian economy (and equal to that of 
Ghana) and finished at levels well above.  
In an attempt to identify dynamic economies we constructed a typology based on 
income levels. We split the timeseries into two subperiods, 1975-94 and 1995-2005. For 
each year, we calculate Sub-Saharan Africa’s median GDP per capita and then check 
whether each country’s GDP per capita was above or below the median. A country 
whose GDP per capita remained above the median for the majority of years in 1975-94 
is assigned to category ‘A’, meaning that its GDP per capita was generally ‘above’ the 
benchmark. A country whose GDP per capita remained below the median for most 
years is assigned category ‘B’, meaning ‘below’.18 The same exercise is carried out for 
1995-2005. Because it is possible for a country to switch categories, we have four 
possible combinations:19  
AA – Countries with GDP per capita above Africa’s median GDP per capita for most 
years of the first and second periods; 
BB – Countries with GDP per capita below Africa’s median GDP per capita for most 
years of the first and second periods; 
BA – Countries with GDP per capita that switches from below to above Africa’s 
median GDP per capita from the first to the second period; 
AB – Countries with GDP per capita that switches from above to below Africa’s 
median GDP per capita from the first to the second period. 
The results of this classification exercise are presented in Table 4. Figure 12 shows the 
GDP per capita by country group over time. Basic statistics on the country groups are 
presented in Table A3 in the Appendix.  
                                                 
18  Bosworth and Collins (2003) have a similar method for grouping countries. They group 84 countries 
from all regions as higher income and lower income, according to the per capita income above or 
below the median. However, they take the income per capita in 1960, their first year, as reference for 
grouping. Garner (2006) uses average long-term growth rates to classify African countries. We also 
have tested other criteria for grouping countries, using means instead of medians, growth instead of 
GDP per capita level, and clustering analysis, among others; but the present exercise provides the 
most robust results. We run the median exercise removing South Africa, but the classification of 
countries remains basically the same. 
19    Appendix Table A2 shows the countries’ GDP per capita and median by year and respective 
assignments to country groups.  
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Again, we find evidence of two clubs—rich nations and poor nations—with little 
mobility between them.20 GDP per capita is four times higher in AA countries than in 
BB countries, and t-statistics reject the equality of means of GDP per capita between the 
two groups. There was also increasing divergence in income levels between the two 
groups over time (Figure 12). Income per capita on average remained largely stagnant 
for AA countries between 1975 and 1995, but it increased substantially thereafter. The 
average per capita income of the BB countries declined until around 1995 after which 
there was a slight recovery, but the average real income of the BB group was the same 
in 2005 as in 1975. The CV of GDP per capita of AA countries increased from 0.77 in 
1975-94 to 0.87 in 1995-2005. The CV of the BB group increased from 0.26 to 0.30. 
Thus, part of the increasing income inequality identified in section 3 is driven by the 
large and rising income dispersion among countries in the richer group.  
Table 4 




(avg growth below 0) 
Stagnant economies 
(avg growth between 0 & 0.71%)
Growing economies 
(avg growth above 0.71%) 
AA Comoros  c  (-0.14)  Angola a (0.70)  Botswana  b (6.24) 
 Côte  d’Ivoire  a  (-1.57) Gambia  c (0.29)  Cape  Verde  c (3.26) 
 Gabon  a (-0.91) Ghana  c (0.60)  Cameroon  a (0.81) 
 Togo  c  (-0.60) Guinea  b (0.62)  Lesotho  d (3.27) 
 Zimbabwe  d  (-1.26) Mauritania  c (0.10)  Mauritius  c (4.22) 
   Senegal  c (0.36)  Namibia  b (1.15) 
   South  Africa  c (0.12)  Seychelles  c (2.47) 
     Swaziland  d (1.15) 
      
BB Burundi  d (-1.26)  Benin  c (0.60)  Burkina  Faso  d (1.21) 
 Guinea-Bissau  c  (-0.70) Congo  a (0.61)  Chad  a (1.34) 
 Madagascar  c  (-1.38)
   
Ethiopia d (0.42)  Eritrea  c (1.96) 
 Niger  d  (-1.00) Kenya  c (0.48)  Mali  d (0.86) 
 Sierra  Leone  b  (-0.57) Malawi  d (0.22)  Mozambique  c (2.07) 
 Zambia  b (-1.16) Nigeria  a (0.29)  Rwanda  d (1.68) 
     Tanzania c (1.69) 
     Uganda  d (1.92) 
      
BA     Equatorial  Guinea  a (10.55) 
     Sudan  a (1.72) 
AB  Central African Rep.d(-1.27)    
 DRC  d (-3.95)     
Notes:  0.71% is the average growth rate in 1975-2005; 
  Average growth rate in parentheses; 
  a Oil  exporter; 
  b  non-oil resource intensive; 
  c  Non-resource intensive, coastal country; 
  d  Non-resource intensive, landlocked country. 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
                                                 
20 To test the robustness of the country group classification we estimate pooled and fixed-effect 
regression models. Country group coefficients for income levels are statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level; they are sizable and have the expected signs. These results suggest that the country 
group classifications are relevant and highly stable in predicting income levels (Arbache and Page 
2008).   
16 
Figure 12 
GDP per capita by country-group 
 Source:  Authors’ computations. 
 
The AA group had higher mean growth over the whole period 1975-2005 (0.85 per 
cent) than BB (0.39 per cent). Growth was more erratic in the poorer countries. The 
coefficient of variation of growth is 4.67 for the BB category and 1.37 for the AA 
group. Given the high variance of growth rates, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal 
mean growth rates in AA and BB countries between 1975 and 2005. Between 1995 and 
2005 the two groups had virtually identical growth rates of about 1.60 per cent per year. 
Within each group there is a wide diversity of growth performance. Growth rates in the 
AA group, for example, range from 6.24 per cent for Botswana to -1.26 per cent for 
Zimbabwe. The range of growth outcomes is somewhat more compact for the BB 
group, varying between 2.07 per cent for Mozambique and -1.38 per cent for 
Madagascar. All five of the region’s fastest growing economies for the period 1975-
2005 are in the AA group.  
One striking, and disappointing, feature from the point of view of hunting for leopards 
is the small number of transitional cases (BA or AB). BA countries comprise only 
Equatorial Guinea and Sudan, both oil exporters. These economies grew on average by 
4.4 per cent a year over the entire period, but their expansion was driven by very rapid 
growth in 1995-2005, when annual growth was 8.3 per cent (from 1.8 per cent in the 
first period). That boom enabled their GDP per capita to increase by 60 per cent 
between 1975 and 2005. The AB economies—the Central African Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo—collapsed, mainly as a result of conflicts, leading 
average GDP per capita to shrink by more than half.  
Given the diversity of growth experiences within our stable lower and higher income 
groups, it is possible our leopards are emerging within groups rather than between the 
groups. To continue our search for growth leaders, we use a variation of the 





















































































































































accelerations (good times) and decelerations (bad times). Our approach (Arbache and 
Page 2007) differs from theirs and that of researchers applying their method to Africa 
(IMF 2007) in two important respects. First, it identifies both growth accelerations and 
decelerations in a cross-section of countries. Second, it does not use a common 
threshold growth rate to identify growth accelerations. Instead, it defines good and bad 
times relative to each country’s long-run economic performance. This seems appropriate 
in Africa’s volatile, low-growth environment. 
Four conditions define good times for a given country:  
–  First, the 4-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita growth minus the 
four-year backward-moving average is greater than zero for a given year; 
–  Second, the 4-year forward-moving average of growth is above the country’s 
long-run trend;  
–  Third, the 4-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita exceeds the four-
year backward-moving average; and  
–  Fourth, the first three conditions are satisfied for at least three years in a row, 
followed by the three subsequent years after the last year that satisfies the first 
three conditions.  
Growth decelerations—bad times—are defined by the opposites of the first three 
conditions for good times, and the presence of the fourth. 
Table 5 shows the relative frequency of accelerations and decelerations, and their 
respective growth rates, for different periods. Between 1975 and 2005, there was a 
slightly higher probability that the representative African economy was in a growth 
acceleration than a deceleration: 25 per cent of the 1,243 total observations per country 
per year identify growth accelerations, while 22 per cent identify growth 
decelerations.21 The remaining country-year observations reflect normal economic 
times with countries growing at about their trend growth rate.  Countries that 
experienced growth accelerations managed to grow on average by 3.6 per cent per year 
during those episodes, compared with the region-wide average of 0.7 per cent. During 
decelerations, countries contracted on average by -2.7 per cent. Consistent with the 
region’s long-run growth trend, the period 1995-2005 saw a substantial increase in the 
frequency of growth accelerations and a corresponding reduction in growth declines 
compared to the previous 20 years.  
Table 6 shows the frequency of growth accelerations by country for the three periods of 
our analysis. Most countries experienced a higher frequency of growth accelerations 
after 1995 compared with 1975-94. Burkina Faso and Ghana were in a growth 
acceleration during the entire period 1995-2005, and Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Sudan, and Tanzania accelerated at a frequency above 70 per cent. 
Burundi, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Swaziland in contrast 
had a reduction in the frequency of growth accelerations relative to earlier periods.  
                                                 
21 As a means of checking the robustness of the results, growth accelerations and decelerations are also 
identified by replacing 0 with +1 per cent and −1 per cent for acceleration and deceleration, 
respectively, in condition 1, but the results do not change substantially. Therefore, only the base-case 
results are reported, because they are less restrictive  
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Table 5 
Likelihood and growth rates of economic acceleration and deceleration 
in Africa, 1975-2005 
 
All country-years      



























1995-2005 (after trend break) 494  1.88  0.42  3.76 0.12 -1.29 0.46 
         
1975-94 (before trend break) 749  -0.07 0.14  3.39 0.29 -3.14 0.57 
  1985-94  433  -0.23  0.21  3.21  0.36  -3.18  0.43 
  1975-84  316  0.13  0.04  4.61  0.18  -3.06  0.78 
         
1975-2005 (all years)  1,243  0.7  0.25  3.64 0.22 -2.74 0.53 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
Table 6 
Likelihood of growth acceleration by country 
Country    1975-05   1975-94    1995-05   
 Frequency of growth acceleration 
(1995-2005) above the region’s 
average of 0.42? 
Angola  0.48 0.43 0.55  Yes 
Benin  0.27 0.11 0.55  Yes 
Botswana  0.43 0.37 0.55  Yes 
Burkina Faso   0.43  0.11  1.00  Yes 
Burundi    0.20 0.32 0.00  No 
Cameroon    0.23 0.00 0.64  Yes 
Cape Verde   0.42  0.23  0.64  Yes 
Central African   0.23  0.00  0.64  Yes 
Chad    0.20 0.00 0.55  Yes 
Comoros    0.24 0.00 0.55  Yes 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Congo, Rep.   0.20  0.32  0.00  No 
Côte  d'Ivoire    0.20 0.05 0.45  Yes 
Equatorial  Guinea    0.42 0.22 0.60  Yes 
Eritrea    0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Ethiopia    0.25 0.15 0.36  No 
Gabon    0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Gambia, The   0.00  0.00  0.00  No 
Ghana    0.43 0.11 1.00  Yes 
Guinea    0.37 0.25 0.45  Yes 
Guinea-Bissau    0.23 0.37 0.00  No 
Kenya    0.20 0.32 0.00  No 
Lesotho    0.23 0.37 0.00  No 
Madagascar  0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Malawi  0.23 0.16 0.36  No 
Mali  0.33 0.05 0.82  Yes 
Mauritania    0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Mauritius    0.28 0.50 0.00  No 
Mozambique    0.32 0.07 0.64  Yes 
Namibia    0.32 0.00 0.73  Yes 
Niger    0.00 0.00 0.00  No 
Nigeria    0.53 0.37 0.82  Yes 
      Table  6  continues 
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Table 6 (con’t) 
Likelihood of growth acceleration by country 
Country    1975-05   1975-94    1995-05   
 Frequency of growth acceleration 
(1995-2005) above the region’s 
average of 0.42? 
Rwanda    0.20 0.00 0.55  Yes 
Senegal    0.27 0.05 0.64  Yes 
Seychelles    0.53 0.53 0.55  Yes 
Sierra  Leone    0.20 0.00 0.55  Yes 
South  Africa    0.23 0.00 0.64  Yes 
Sudan    0.30 0.00 0.82  Yes 
Swaziland    0.27 0.42 0.00  No 
Tanzania    0.47 0.00 0.73  Yes 
Togo    0.20 0.05 0.45  Yes 
Uganda    0.30 0.25 0.36  No 
Zambia    0.23 0.00 0.64  Yes 
Zimbabwe    0.20 0.11 0.36  No 
   
Total    0.25 0.14 0.42   
Source: Authors’  computations. 
Table 7 presents information on growth rates by country on average and during 
acceleration episodes for the relevant time periods. The last two columns show the 
deviation of the growth rate during accelerations from trend (1975-2005).22  
We could attempt to use the increase in the relative frequency of growth accelerations as 
a criterion for identifying potential leopards. Using that criterion alone would lead us 
toward picking such dramatically improved performers as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, 
Sudan and Tanzania, for example. It would, however, also lead us to exclude such 
historically strong economies as Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius. This is partly an 
artifact of our method of identifying growth accelerations. Because we define an 
acceleration (or deceleration) relative to an economy’s own long-run trend growth rate, 
a sustained small improvement from a low long-run trend, while clearly beneficial, 
would not qualify for leopard status.   
Rather, we identify potential leopards as those countries that had both sustained long-
term growth and a high frequency of growth accelerations using the following four 
criteria: 
–  The average growth for the economy equals or exceeds average per capita 
growth for the entire period 1975-2005 (0.71 per cent). 
–  The average growth rate for the economy in the period 1995-2005 equals or 
exceeds average per capita growth for 1979-2005 (1.88 per cent). 
–  The frequency of growth accelerations for the economy during 1995-2005 equals 
or exceeds the average frequency for 1995-2005 (0.42). 
–  The growth rate of the economy during growth accelerations in 1995-2005 equals 
or exceeds the average for all growth accelerations 1975-2005 (3.64 per cent).  
                                                 
22 Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi and Mali show negative average growth rates during accelerations in 
1975-1994. This is due to negative growth rates in the first year(s) of the acceleration episodes.  
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Table 7 
Growth rate during acceleration, by country 
  Growth rate (%) 
 
Growth rate during 
acceleration (%) 




















































































Angola   0.70  -3.34  5.84  3.93 1.55 6.30  -60.49  60.49 
Benin   0.60  0.07  1.50  1.60 0.22 2.07  -86.43  28.81 
Botswana   6.24  6.50  5.78  6.87 7.41 6.24  7.85  -9.16 
Burkina Faso   1.21  0.96  1.66 1.39  -0.06  1.66  -104.39  18.98 
Burundi   -0.46  0.58  -2.26  1.48  1.48  NA  NA  Na 
Cameroon   0.81  0.14  1.97  2.21 NA  2.21  NA  0.00 
Cape Verde   3.26  3.14  3.40  3.57 3.19 3.73 -10.52  4.51 
Central African Republic   -1.27  -1.81 -0.34  0.89  NA  0.89  NA  0.00 
Chad   1.34  -0.30  4.18  7.66 NA  7.66  NA  0.00 
Comoros   -0.14  -0.36  0.13  0.11  NA  0.11  NA  0.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   -3.95  -4.85  -2.38  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Congo, Rep.   0.61  0.75  0.37 10.05  10.05  NA  0.00  Na 
Cote  d'Ivoire    -1.57 -2.47 -0.02  1.82 -2.12  2.61 -216.47  43.29 
Equatorial Guinea   10.55  0.66  19.45 20.88  3.09  26.81 -85.19  28.40 
Eritrea   1.96  17.24  -0.82  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Ethiopia   0.42  -1.37  2.54  3.71 8.16 1.49 119.81  -59.90 
Gabon   -0.91  -1.43  -0.01  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Gambia, The   0.29  0.04  0.73  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Ghana   0.60  -0.40  2.31  2.15 1.30 2.31  -39.67  7.21 
Guinea   0.97  0.31  1.46  1.78 0.28 2.39  -84.30  33.72 
Guinea-Bissau   -0.70  0.08  -2.05  0.76  0.76  NA  0.00  Na 
Kenya   0.48  0.39  0.64  1.76 1.76 NA  0.00 Na 
Lesotho   3.27  3.78  2.39  3.83 3.83 NA  0.00 Na 
Madagascar   -1.38  -2.26  0.14  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Malawi   0.22  -0.89  2.15  1.68 -3.54  5.59 -310.57  232.93 
Mali   0.86  -0.29  2.85  2.75 -1.75  3.25 -163.73  18.19 
Mauritania   0.10  -0.42  0.99  NA  NA  NA    NA  Na 
Mauritius   4.22  4.67  3.65 5.65  5.65  NA 0.00  Na 
Mozambique   2.07  -0.61  5.49  5.08 3.08 5.37 -39.32  5.62 
Namibia   0.15  -1.12  1.75  2.14 Na  2.14  NA  0.00 
Niger   -1.00  -1.55  -0.07  NA  NA  NA  NA  Na 
Nigeria   0.28  -0.57  1.74  1.99 2.01 1.97  1.09  -0.85 
Rwanda   1.68  -0.51  5.47  2.27 NA  2.27  NA  0.00 
Senegal   0.36  -0.64  2.08  1.75 0.22 1.96  -87.61  12.52 
Seychelles   2.47  3.58  0.54  4.01 4.27 3.58  6.43  -10.72 
Sierra Leone   -0.57  -1.56  1.15  7.95  NA  7.95  NA  0.00 
South Africa   0.12  -0.61  1.38 1.96  NA  1.96 NA  0.00 
Sudan   1.72  0.39  4.02  3.90 NA  3.90  NA  0.00 
Swaziland   1.15  1.56  0.45 4.63  4.63  NA  0.00  Na 
Tanzania   1.69  -0.69  2.98  3.69 NA  3.69  NA  0.00 
Togo   -0.60  -1.39  0.76  4.27 12.03  2.71  182.01  -36.40 
Uganda   1.92  0.73  3.21  3.69 2.67 4.45  -27.66  20.74 
Zambia   -1.23  -2.60  1.13  2.35  NA  2.35  NA  0.00 
Zimbabwe   -1.26  -0.18  -3.14  2.61  2.95  2.45  12.89  -6.45 
Source: Authors’  computations.  
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We believe that these criteria reflect some of the most important characteristics of 
successful countries to emerge from our analysis of growth dynamics. A country 
meeting all four criteria would have grown faster than the regional average, both from 
1975 to 2005, showing some growth persistence, and during 1995-2005, showing 
average growth above the rising trend. It would also have had a higher than average 
frequency of growth accelerations in 1995-2005 and would have grown during those 
accelerations at a rate that exceeded the overall regional average. 
Eight countries—Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Mozambique, Equatorial 
Guinea, Sudan, and Tanzania—(18.2 per cent of our sample) meet all four criteria.23 
This is a small enough set of countries, set sufficiently apart from their regional 
neighbours to provide a basis for identifying them as high performers.24 The criteria are 
sufficiently restrictive that only an additional four counties in the sample—Cameroon, 
Mali, Rwanda and Uganda—meet three out of four. The remaining 32 countries (73 per 
cent of the sample) meet two or fewer criteria. 
There are some surprises in the results, at least from the perspective of popular views on 
recent African growth. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda, 
all praised in recent donor publications as good performers (see for example World 
Bank 2007), do not appear among our leopard candidates, although most meet at least 
two of the criteria and Rwanda and Uganda meet three. Mauritius and Lesotho, 
sustained growers for the past 30 years, fail to make the cut due to the absence of 
growth accelerations in 1995-2005. 
In terms of our prior classification of countries by income groups, both transitional (BA) 
economies, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan, meet our four criteria. The remaining 
countries are drawn equally from the growing economies of both the AA and BB 
classifications (Table 4). Angola, Botswana and Cape Verde are growing AA 
economies; Chad, Mozambique and Tanzania are growing BB economies. Angola, 
Chad, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan are resource rich. Cape Verde, 
Mozambique and Tanzania are more diversified, coastal economies. Botswana is the 
only landlocked country. 
Have we found the leopards in these six economies? In light of the income dynamics 
described in sections 1-4, we should be cautious before declaring the hunt over. Perhaps 
the most worrying feature of our set of high performers is the presence of five resource 
rich economies among the eight. One of these, Botswana, is a perennial growth leader, 
not just in Africa but globally. It certainly has much to offer to other resource rich 
countries in Africa in terms of lessons of 30 years of experience in transforming natural 
resource wealth into economic growth. But, given the history of resource abundant 
economies in Africa—and the negative income dynamics we note for several mineral 
dependent economies—we are somewhat reluctant to identify the other resource rich 
economies in the sample as long-term growth leaders. Elsewhere (Arbache and Page 
2007) we have shown that conflicts are associated with a higher probability of growth 
declines. It is noteworthy that Angola, Chad and Sudan all have a recent history of 
conflicts, making the durability of their growth uncertain.  
                                                 
23 Actually, as Angola misses the first criterion by only 0.01, we decided to include it in the list. 
24 These countries represented 16.5 per cent of the population and 15.6 per cent of regional GDP in 
2005.  
22 
Of the diversified, coastal economies, Cape Verde has the longest history of economic 
success, but it is extremely small (although so too were Hong King and Singapore at 
one time) and highly dependent on international migrant remittances for much of its 
income growth. Mozambique and Tanzania, both of which are diverse relatively large 
economies by African standards, may offer greater prospects of emerging as models for 
other coastal countries.  
We may also have excluded some longer term good performers such as Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Rwanda and Uganda unfairly, by placing substantial weight on the frequency 
and pace of recent growth accelerations. Because our definition of growth accelerations 
is relative to the long-run rate of growth of the economy, these long-term growers may 
be victims of their own success; by growing relatively fast achieving further 
accelerations is made that much more difficult. Alternatively, had we placed even 
greater weight on growth accelerations, we might have included Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Mali, Namibia and Nigeria among the list of countries with increasing growth potential, 
given the high frequency with which they experienced accelerated growth in 1995-2005.  
To sum up, we believe that our hunt for leopards has been a moderate success. Not 
surprisingly, many of Africa’s potential growth leaders are rich in natural resources. For 
them—to the extent that oil and minerals prices remain high—the challenge will be less 
about maintaining growth than about using resource rents well. Botswana has shown 
that this is possible, but, given the history of natural resource revenue management in 
Africa, it may be the only true leopard to emerge from this group. We are somewhat 
more optimistic about the group of diversified economies. Cape Verde has a long track 
record of good and accelerating economic growth. Mozambique and Tanzania clearly 
have shown growth potential. If we add the ‘near misses’—Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda 
and Uganda—to the list, we have a group of economies from which some leopards seem 
likely to emerge. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has described some long-term features of the growth and distribution of GDP 
per capita among countries in Sub-Saharan African. Our main goal was to identify the 
long-term patterns and regularities in income dynamics across countries and to search 
for leopards—economies that stood out with respect to the speed and persistence of their 
growth. Our main findings are the following: 
Growth has been low and volatile. African countries have erratic growth around a low 
mean. Growth is extremely volatile across Africa, and this phenomenon is not restricted 
to economies with any specific economic or geographic attributes.  
Growth has accelerated since the mid 1990s. A structural break in both the per capita 
income and growth series for the region took place around 1995, when the growth rate 
accelerated significantly across the continent. More countries experienced more 
frequent growth accelerations relative to their long-term trend, and the distribution of 
growth rates began to converge.  
There is significant inertia in the distribution of income across countries. Our 
econometric results indicate that there is no convergence of incomes taking place across  
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Africa, and that at the individual country level there is a high degree of inertia in 
average per capita incomes. Income in 1975 is a good predictor of average income for 
both the whole of 1975-2005 and for 1995-2005.  
Africa’s cross-country income distribution is becoming less equal. Africa can be divided 
into rich and poor income clubs. Despite recent improvements in growth performance in 
poor countries, the richest countries have grown more in the long-run, and that has 
increased the income gap. As a consequence, the distribution of incomes among 
countries in Africa is becoming less equal.  
Initial conditions matter a great deal for income distribution but not for growth. Initial 
conditions, represented by the economy’s 1975 level of income, seem to be the single 
most important factor explaining income levels. Whatever the mechanics behind this 
phenomenon, it exerts a strong and persistent influence on income determination and on 
the structure of income among countries. We do not find evidence that initial conditions 
are associated with long-run growth.  
A small number of countries have emerged as possible ‘leopards’, but we remain 
uncertain as to the durability of their growth. Using a combination of income 
transitions, growth thresholds, and growth accelerations, we identify eight economies as 
Africa’s potential growth leaders. Five of the eight, however, are resource rich 
economies, which our analysis of growth dynamics suggests may underperform their 
potential. One of these, Botswana, is a long time high performer. The four other 
resource-rich economies—Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan—meet our 
criteria, but we are somewhat reluctant to identify them as leopards. Of the diversified 
coastal economies Cape Verde has the longest history of economic success, but is 
highly dependent on international remittances for much of its income growth. 
Mozambique and Tanzania may offer prospects of emerging as models for other African 
economies.  
We began this paper by asking whether the growth turn-around in Africa marked a 
reversal of the nearly three-decade decline in Africa’s economic fortunes. We found 
evidence of a statistically significant rise in growth and per capita incomes for the 
region, but we are left wondering whether the good times will last. While growth on 
average has accelerated and volatility has declined since 1995, we still find considerable 
inertia in Africa’s income dynamics, even post 1995. The level where the typical 
country had started in 1975 pretty much determined where it ended up in terms of 
average income. The rich and poor country clubs were remarkably stable and there were 
very few transitional cases. The rich were getting a bit richer, but the poor were getting 
richer more slowly, which led to rising inequality in the country-level distribution of 
incomes. We identify a small number of high performing economies, but most of these 
were resource rich. And, while we find some potential leopards among the region’s 
more diversified economies, Africa will need more growth leaders, drawn from a wider 
variety of geological and geographical circumstances before we can confidently assert 
that it has turned the corner.   
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Appendix Table A1: Countries' descriptive statistics, 1975-2005
GDP per capita growth
Average Standard  Coefficient  Average Standard  Coefficient 
Country 1975 2005 annual  deviation  of  variation  annual  deviation  Min  Max  of  variation 
Angola 2,077 1,608 242.5 0.151 0.70 8.31 -27.13 17.21 11.92
Benin 860 1,015 914 56.3 0.062 0.60 2.96 -7.64 6.38 4.95
Botswana 1,820 11,021 5,474 2637.0 0.482 6.24 3.36 -0.58 16.07 0.54
Burkina Faso  763 1,079 918 81.5 0.089 1.21 3.30 -4.36 7.16 2.72
Burundi 738 622 785 104.1 0.133 -0.46 4.65 -8.92 9.18 -10.02
Cameroon 1,702 2,045 2,054 345.6 0.168 0.81 6.51 -10.51 18.42 8.00
Cape Verde  - 5,162 3,686 799.0 0.217 3.26 2.52 -1.56 8.51 0.77
CAR 1,646 1,089 1,330 201.6 0.152 -1.27 4.42 -10.70 6.47 -3.48
Chad 972 1,270 879 133.9 0.152 1.34 9.57 -23.04 25.23 7.13
Comoros - 1,773 1,845 107.1 0.058 -0.14 3.23 -7.85 6.24 -22.65
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2,214 635 1,271 539.4 0.425 -3.95 5.07 -16.59 3.54 -1.28
Congo, Rep.  998 1,123 1,163 181.6 0.156 0.61 6.77 -11.77 19.76 11.14
Côte d'Ivoire  2,433 1,466 1,881 429.3 0.228 -1.57 4.51 -15.14 7.81 -2.87
Equatorial Guinea  - - 2,859 2110.0 0.738 10.55 17.62 -6.16 67.09 1.67
Eritrea - 986 1,078 134.5 0.125 1.96 9.11 -16.30 20.92 4.66
Ethiopia - 938 817 76.7 0.094 0.42 7.78 -13.87 16.43 18.41
Gabon 9,323 6,187 7,041 1389.3 0.197 -0.91 9.60 -26.25 31.80 -10.60
Gambia, The  1,584 1,709 1,633 50.9 0.031 0.29 2.92 -6.09 7.24 9.90
Ghana 1,885 2,206 1,756 201.1 0.115 0.60 3.78 -10.08 6.70 6.33
Guinea - 2,060 1,873 122.0 0.065 0.97 1.55 -2.64 3.41 1.59
Guinea-Bissau 1,019 736 921 104.3 0.113 -0.70 8.36 -29.98 14.81 -11.95
Kenya 963 1,103 1,051 39.7 0.038 0.48 2.29 -3.89 5.49 4.78
Lesotho 1,176 2,967 2,102 517.8 0.246 3.27 5.47 -5.77 19.04 1.67
Madagascar 1,290 821 947 154.6 0.163 -1.38 4.68 -15.19 6.92 -3.39
Malawi 579 593 565 40.1 0.071 0.22 5.41 -11.03 15.13 24.57
Mali 742 919 764 80.0 0.105 0.86 5.49 -13.45 10.92 6.36
Mauritania 1,963 1,988 1,915 63.1 0.033 0.10 3.40 -6.62 6.96 34.58
Mauritius - 11,312 7,318 2327.4 0.318 4.22 1.66 1.69 8.46 0.39
Mozambique - 1,105 704 168.7 0.24 2.07 7.34 -17.45 14.75 3.54
Namibia - 6,749 5,875 415.9 0.071 0.15 2.89 -5.11 5.03 19.82
Niger 985 695 829 150.5 0.181 -1.00 5.45 -19.42 10.04 -5.43
Nigeria 961 1,003 865 90.6 0.105 0.28 5.15 -15.54 8.20 18.67
Rwanda 840 1,073 1,031 123.9 0.12 1.68 12.25 -47.00 37.48 7.28
Senegal 1,468 1,594 1,408 80.3 0.057 0.36 4.12 -6.77 12.19 11.57
Seychelles 7,363 14,329 12,113 2954.6 0.244 2.47 6.91 -9.23 19.28 2.80
Sierra Leone  935 717 770 166.8 0.217 -0.57 7.97 -19.26 21.82 -14.04
South Africa  9,625 9,884 9,242 517.5 0.056 0.12 2.41 -4.33 4.17 20.64
Sudan 1,161 1,853 1,287 220.6 0.171 1.72 5.52 -8.80 13.09 3.21
Swaziland 3,103 4,292 3,664 578.0 0.158 1.15 3.64 -5.19 11.13 3.17
Tanzania - 662 529 53.3 0.101 1.69 2.65 -2.73 5.06 1.57
Togo 1,708 1,340 1,490 182.5 0.123 -0.60 6.44 -17.14 12.05 -10.68
Uganda - 1,293 976 181.3 0.186 1.92 3.15 -6.59 8.09 1.64
Zambia 1,351 910 981 182.3 0.186 -1.23 4.01 -10.92 4.31 -3.26
Zimbabwe 2,784 1,813 2,526 253.2 0.1 -1.26 5.71 -11.25 10.46 -4.53
GDP per capita
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